A considerable body of work has invoked learning in seeking to explain observed patterns of EU policy change. This paper scrutinizes the relevance of learning for understanding policy outcomes. We apply a consolidated framework based on factual, experiential and constructivist learning across the individual and organizational levels to examine the unlikely policy outcome of dedicating 20% of the EU 2014-2020 budget to climate action. Learning did play some role in the policy outcome, in that the belief that climate policy integration (CPI) was an appropriate instrument to address climate change was the result of constructivist learning over the preceding decade. However, this learning was restricted to a handful of policy entrepreneurs in the Cabinet/DG Clima, who largely "pushed" the policy through based on preexisting convictions. Conversely, beyond some experiential learning, there is little evidence that learning was a significant feature of the policy process amongst actors in other European institutions.
INTRODUCTION
The past two decades have witnessed growing interest in the role of learning in policy and politics -where learning is typically understood as a process of updating knowledge, understanding and beliefs. Learning has been invoked to explain changes in political agendas, the choice of policies and instruments, as well as the dynamics of organizational processes and strategies (Bomberg 2007; Feindt 2010; Kamkhaji and Radaelli 2016; Koch and Lindenthal 2011) . Underlying this interest in learning is increased recognition of the role of knowledge, beliefs and ideas in policy processes Nye 1987; Radaelli 1995) .
The idea of learning is certainly a seductive, even convenient, one. It offers a positive model of human agency predicated on transformative change through information, critical reflection and value change. Moreover, learning provides scholars with a range of mechanisms to account for policy change, which cannot readily be explained by recourse to conventional explanations such as coercion (Radaelli 2009 ).
Yet the assumed role of learning in policy change has come in for growing criticism. Methodologically, critiques have focused on the tendency of researchers to privilege learning, as opposed to non-learning (avoiding to learn) or no learning in the policy process (Egan 2009; Radaelli 2009 ). They have also drawn attention to the difficulty of distinguishing learning from other possible explanations of change (Dunlop and Radaelli 2016; Zito and Schout 2009 ). The literature has also been criticized conceptually for its diverse, overlapping terminology. To this list, we would add two further critiques of our own. First, previous studies have not always adopted a very precise, or even demanding, definition of learning. The result is considerable analytical ambiguity as to what does, and does not, qualify as learning.
Second, too much of the existing literature on learning has exclusively focused on policy processes or organizational change, leaving unanswered questions about the degree to which learning actually matters for policy outcomes.
This contribution addresses some of these shortcomings. First, we seek to bring analytical clarity to the literature on learning, adopting a more stringent definition of learning that goes beyond the mere act of accumulating new information. Additionally, departing from the various typologies dominating recent work (e.g. Heikkila and Gerlak 2013; Zito and Schout 2009 ), we draw on foundational concepts in the learning literature to distinguish between generic types and levels of learning. Second, we move beyond a simple focus on the incidence of learning, to additionally examine the connection between learning and policy outcomes. A major question we ask is whether the concept of learning provides explanatory value, over and above other possible factors, in accounting for empirically observed patterns of policy change.
Empirically, we examine the case of mainstreaming climate finance into the European Union (EU) budget. This makes a good test case within the present context in that the literature frequently asserts that learning plays an important role in environmental and climate policy integration (EPI/CPI). Underlying its assumed significance is the idea that EPI/CPI is underpinned by new knowledge, and stronger forms of integration are likely to require changes in beliefs about the importance of climate change and/or the goals of policy intervention (Nilsson and Eckerberg 2007; Jordan and Lenschow 2010) . Indeed, addressing climate change through a non-trivial allocation of the EU budget to CPI measures marked a significant departure from the status quo, suggesting an important role for learning in the reframing of policy objectives and the adoption of an innovative policy response. The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section two reviews different ways in which learning has been conceptualized, while section three highlights some of the challenges involved in using the concept of learning to explain policy change. Our analytical framework is developed in section four and section five illustrates the role of learning in the case of integrating climate finance into the EU budget. Discussion and conclusions are presented in sections six and seven, respectively.
LEARNING, POLICY AND CAUSALITY
Recent work in political science has typically approached learning in one of two different ways.
3 One is as a theoretical lens (or approach) to guide analysis of the policy process (e.g. Dunlop and Radaelli 2013; Dunlop and Radaelli 2016) , while the other is as a largely empirical phenomenon where the emphasis is on analyzing the presence (or absence) of learning (e.g., by Nilsson 2005; Nilsson and Eckerberg 2007; Schout 2009 ). Our contribution in the present article resides within this latter set of studies although, as explained below, it advances beyond a simple binary analysis to interrogate the "quality" of learning.
The existing literature has, implicitly or explicitly, invoked learning in at least three different ways in seeking to understand policy change. First, learning has been deployed as a 3 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this distinction.
causal factor in policy outcomes. That is, it is assumed that, as a result of a process of learning, new (or revised) policies are demanded, searched for, adopted and possibly implemented (Schout 2009) . In this sense, learning precedes policy change, and can be conceptualized as an explanatory variable in its own right. A second way in which learning has been invoked is as a conditioning (or intervening) variable. More specifically, learning is assumed to enable and/or facilitate policy change by changing the frames, processes and strategies through which individuals and organizations interpret information and policy challenges, and their responses to them (Braun 2009; Dunlop 2010; Farrell 2009; Koch and Lindenthal 2011; Zito and Schout 2009 2007) . In fact, learning may be one of the objectives of a policy, and therefore the relevant output from a particular policy change (e.g. Dunlop 2015) .
In reality, the distinction between these three applications may be less clear cut and unidirectional than the above typology suggests. While learning may propel or facilitate policy change, policy change itself may lead to learning, with the result that learning and policy change can be seen as part of an iterative cycle. Still, the three-fold typology of learning as an independent/explanatory, intervening or dependent variable remains useful in seeking to empirically understand the relationship between policy change and learning, which has often been ambiguous in the literature. It is also useful in evaluating the significance of different forms of learning.
Regardless of whether learning is approached as a driver, an input or output, a common assumption is that learning is important (Bennett and Howlett 1992; Zito and Schout 2009 ). To begin with, learning is assumed to matter because the external or internal demands for change depend on whether and how actors conceive a particular issue as worthy of policy attention. Another way in which learning is believed to matter is by shaping the response to these demands, whether in terms of organizational behavior and strategy or policy outputs.
Regarding the former, learning is conceptualized as influencing the routines, problem-solving capabilities and goal orientation of organizations (Heikkila and Gerlak 2013; March and Olsen 1975) . The importance of learning for policy stems from its hypothesized role in influencing the potential choice set, appropriateness and selection of regulatory approaches, instruments and how these are articulated in practice (Nilsson and Eckerberg 2007; Radaelli 2009 ).
CAVEATS TO LEARNING
While learning has been widely invoked, there is a danger in exaggerating its incidence and substantive importance (Radaelli 2009; Zito and Schout 2009 (Bürgin 2015) , using their energies, skills and acumen (Kingdon 1995) . A second reason to be cautious is that actors simply may not learn. Although exposed to new information, ideas and values, they may choose to ignore these, and carry on as usual. This may occur where actors consciously engage in non-learning because it is not in their interests to change their beliefs and actions, or where they unconsciously engage in defensive avoidance by filtering out new information (Janis and Mann 1977; Koch and Lindenthal 2011; Lindblom 1979; May 1992 ).
Another caveat is that actors may well learn, but there is no guarantee that this will translate into substantive organizational change and/or policy outputs. Organizational barriers, embedded interests, past policy commitments and institutionalized routines can prevent individuals or organizations that have learnt from realizing their ambitions (Egan 2009 is not always straightforward. Moreover, uncovering learning and respondents' true motives for particular courses of action is fraught with problems, particularly because self-reported accounts of learning may be subject to bias (Radaelli 2009 ).
UNPACKING AND DETECTING LEARNING
Given these challenges, an essential starting point for any evaluation is a precise definition of learning, which can be operationalized to determine its empirical existence. To this end, we turn to foundational work, which places considerable emphasis on the essentially reflexive nature of learning. In particular, these contributions treat learning as an active process of change, rather than a passive one of incorporation (Argyris and Schön 1978; Janis and Mann 1977; March and Olsen 1975; Sabatier 1987) . In order for learning to occur, we posit that the following must take place: (1) a reflection and judgment based on an input, experience or detection of error, which leads the individual to select a different view on (2) how things happen, i.e. the acquisition of knowledge or learning facts and (3) what course of action to take, i.e. the reflection on individual or collective experience or advise from others on such previous experiences (based on Argyris and Schön 1978; Bennett and Howlett 1992; May 1992) . In adopting this definition, our work differs from a number of previous studies on learning, which have included in their conception of learning the simple act of acquiring information and experience, without any reflection or change in behavior.
Adopting this more stringent definition of learning is important for two reasons. One is that, in deciphering policy change, it reduces the risk of spurious causality. If learning is responsible for policy change, it is logical that actors should have altered their behavior, choices and actions in response to and reflecting on new information, experiences and insights, or sought to do so. A second reason is that a more discriminating definition and typology of learning renders the concept ultimately more useful. An over-inclusive definition and multitude of overlapping learning types potentially renders learning ubiquitous and, in certain cases, fairly meaningless as an analytic concept to explain policy change. Raising the bar of what constitutes learning (an active process) helps to analytically distinguish learning from other processes with more passive aspects.
We also depart from a number of typologies, which have come to dominate recent work in learning. Amongst others, these have drawn a distinction between political learning, social learning, policy learning, and instrumental learning (e.g. Bennett and Howlett 1992; Bomberg 2007; Braun 2009; Feindt 2010; May 1992; Sabatier 1987; Schout 2009 ). These learning types are useful in categorizing and analyzing learning in particular contexts, for example, learning focused on policy instruments and changing organizational strategies. However, in evaluating learning that shapes policy outcomes, we suggest that it is useful to distinguish between three different generic categories, which seek to capture what is learnt, and how: (1) factual learning; (2) experiential learning and (3) constructivist learning. An advantage of doing so is that it allows us to go beyond a simple preoccupation with documenting whether learning takes place or the ends its serves (e.g. changing political strategies or policy settings). Instead, by drawing a distinction between forms (or modes) of learning (e.g. Dunlop and Radaelli 2013), we are better able to say something about its nature and relevance for policy change. In particular, different forms of learning might be expected to play different roles in policy change, and potentially have greater or lesser impact in shaping outcomes.
Both factual and experiential learning fall into the category of what we could call 'normal' learning, which commonly takes place as a routine part of policymaking processes.
Factual learning involves an increase in scientific, technical or policy/organizational knowledge, coupled with reflection on this knowledge (Argyris and Schön 1978; Haas and Haas 1995) . Experiential learning takes place when actors reflect on their own working experience within the context of a particular activity or as part of an organization. A key aspect of experiential learning is learning how the policymaking system works and becoming skilled at using tactics to influence policy. It is closely aligned with notions of 'political learning' (May 1992; Radaelli 2009 ) and 'policy-oriented' learning (Sabatier 1987) . Many aspects of single-/double loop learning (Argyris and Schön 1978) also fall within the experiential learning category.
Constructivist learning occurs when underlying beliefs change, resulting in a different view of how the individual or organization 'sees things', together with a (potentially) new normative understanding of how things 'ought to be' (Nye 1987) . We categorize constructivist learning as a form of complex learning because it may contribute to more discontinuous policy shifts, as actors form different understandings of relevant problems, solutions and normative obligations.
We conceptualize these different learning types as occurring on two levels: the individual level and the organizational level. The former refers to learning by individual actors (e.g. specific officials), whilst the latter relates to learning at the level of organizations (e.g. 
RESEARCH DESIGN
In order to evaluate the influence of learning on policy change, we apply the framework in- Our reasoning for believing that learning might be a central explanatory variable in the policy innovation of mainstreaming climate finance is two-fold. The first is that mainstreaming represented a major policy shift and, moreover, one likely to have required significant changes in individual and collective understandings of policy challenges and solutions. Previous work has ascribed an important role for learning in accounting for such paradigm shifts in policy (Hall 1993; Feindt 2010 
INTEGRATING CLIMATE FINANCE INTO THE EU BUDGET
In EC18). Following a process of convincing key individuals within Cabinet/DG Clima, this belief was institutionalized. Cabinet/DG Clima recognized the MFF as an opportunity for advancing its organizational objective and hence, "the best vehicle we could find for mainstreaming into other policies (…).
[It] was a really big thing. Because it sets the parameters for the EU's spending programmes until 2020" (EC15).
Co-ordination and co-operation with other Cabinets/DGs was crucial as CPI in the MFF was not a policy proposal in its own right, but consisted of interventions into other Cabinet/DGs' domains, frequently resulting in resistance at the policy drafting stages (EC14; EC15). These issues were not resolved, but carried 'up the hierarchy' into the European It is important to note that most individual policy entrepreneurs (Commissioner on Climate Action, key members of Cabinet/DG Clima and Cabinet/DG Agriculture) had changed or formed their normative beliefs on the importance of addressing climate change before being involved in the MFF negotiations (EC3; EC9; EC11; EC14; EC18; EC19; MS1; MEP2). Individuals across the European institutions who were actively involved in the MFF negotiations did engage in experiential learning on how to play political tactics more successfully to achieve their objectives (EC17; EC18; EC20; EC21). This was evidenced by the parallel negotiations on the EU budget and the CAP reform which, for the first time, involved the European Parliament in a trilogue process (Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood 2015) to achieve agreement among a small number of representatives from the European institutions.
Actors pointed out that "this is the first big co-decision thing, so the learning was more on 'how can we do the co-decision process on such a big file'" (EC17). Cabinet/DG Clima and its representatives engaged in factual learning on CPI by expanding their expertise on CPI as policy instrument. However, given the limited attention to the climate-mainstreaming proposal in the negotiations within the European Commission and between the European institutions, there was little opportunity for reflection and thus factual learning on CPI outside Cabinet/DG Clima. Factual learning on CPI and policy-related facts on the individual and organizational level was also constrained by a lack of time and resources. Interviewees noted that, "especially the Parliament was kind of overwhelmed. They did not have enough staff (…),
[and] they were complaining about this lack of in-depth knowledge" (EC19). Despite these challenges, the Parliament engaged in experiential learning in the trilogues by developing new organizational practices on participating in such negotiations. These practices were embedded in the organizational memory for future MFF negotiations well after individual MEPs left the Parliament.
DISCUSSION ON LEARNING IN POLICYMAKING
Our findings (summarized in Table 2 ) suggest that learning did indeed play a role in the policy outcome. Yet this learning was highly uneven, took place over different time-scales and its actual influence was highly contingent. Much of the learning which took place during the MFF negotiations could be predominantly characterized as 'normal'. In particular, it largely comprised experiential learning (as discussed e.g. by Argyris and Schön 1978; May 1992) , and was the result of individuals' involvement in the policymaking process. Especially those closely involved in the trilogue negotiations actively debated the policy details of the MFF.
They also reflected on the successes and failures of the negotiation process, which resulted in enhanced bureaucratic competencies, and improved negotiation capabilities. Some of the learning related to the trilogues was also institutionalized in the organizational practices of the Parliament.
If the analytical time-frame is extended beyond the period of the MFF negotiations Our findings suggest the need for a more nuanced understanding of the role of learning in policymaking -one that does not deny its role, but acknowledges that learning is multi- Inevitably, our findings need to be qualified. They derive from a single case-study of policy change in which CPI was championed by a handful of influential, committed and politically skilled actors. Furthermore, as with any policy change, deciphering causality within a context where the outcome was potentially influenced by multiple factors remains complicated. Still, with these caveats in mind, our findings have a number of wider implications.
One is for debates surrounding the explanatory value of learning. Certainly, the concept of learning enhances our understanding of policy processes and outcomes. Without learning, it would be difficult to account for how bureaucratic and political actors gain policy expertise in a particular field and use this knowledge to formulate advice, advocacy and new or revised policies. It would also be difficult to account for how actors become more adept in achieving their objectives, for example, adjusting strategies in response to past failures. Learning may additionally help to explain why policy actors select certain policy instruments over others.
Indeed, on the reading of the present case-study, the value-added of learning would appear to lie in better accounting for how actors gain new knowledge, policy ideas and political strategies. In this sense, and returning to the typology outlined earlier, learning can be understood as an intervening variable, which facilitates policy change and the realization of underlying political goals. Where the value of learning is less easily discernible is in shaping these goals, at least over the time-scales typically considered in policy analysis. Learning may well determine the instruments selected to achieve goals. Yet caution is needed in unambiguously situating learning as an explanatory variable for policy change in its own right, not least because the impetus may come from underlying shifts in values and beliefs which take place over much longer time periods.
In drawing these conclusions, our study also highlights the value of disaggregating learning into factual, experiential and constructivist categories, acknowledging that learning is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. Our typology provides a framework for empirically documenting the incidence of different forms of learning, which precedes and accompanies policy change, across three analytically distinct categories. Moreover, disaggregation also better allows us to determine what sorts of learning matter (or do not matter) for the policy outcome, and moreover how they matter (or otherwise). Another implication of our findings is that the extent of learning can be constrained by the very political dynamics of policy change. The literature on CPI places considerable store on interaction (e.g. Nilsson 2005; Nilsson and Eckerberg 2007) . Yet underpinning this model of learning is the assumption that actors already engaged with a particular policy agenda and associated set of beliefs "teach" others (Bomberg 2007 ). This did not occur in our case study, such that integrating climate finance into the EU (and potentially national) budget(s) could be regarded as a missed opportunity for transferring previously occurred individual factual and constructivist learning to the organizational level. Instead, where expediency trumps deliberation, the scope for learning may remain constrained.
